fundamental distinction, one that transcends internal differences among those men and women who think of themselves as historians of science. It is the difference between what some anthropologists call emic and etic. Emic approaches are rooted in the attempt to understand a culture distant in time or space as it is perceived and experienced by its members, while etic approaches see as fundamental a higher, realer reality, an organizing structure that transcends the reality perceived and negotiated by the subjects of one's investigation. I would suggest that a developing structure of scientific ideas is one form of such transcendent framework, a pattern of economic development and class relations in a traditional Marxist formulation another. In philosophy, fundamental problems of metaphysics, epistemology, or scientific method constitute another such framework that informs even the work of those scholars who call themselves historians of philosophy. From the perspective of most contemporary scientists, the historical actor's perceptions and social location are not without interest but are ultimately significant only insofar as they relate to that actor's place in an evolving pattern of cognitive understanding. It is a quintessentially etic point of view. Interest in the structure of professional ambitions, or a time-bound context of education and practice, becomes a kind of antiquarianism: these topics are seen as significant not in themselves but for their relationship to a more fundamental pattern of cognitive development. In this etic perspective, all consciousness is in a measure false consciousness, its ultimate meaning to be derived from its relation to a larger structure, whether social or cognitive. Much of the excitement surrounding Thomas S. Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions a quarter century ago grew out of polarized reactions to its pragmatic-and programmatic-attempt to integrate the emic and etic, the temporal and eternal, to show the relationship between the time-blindered and disciplinary-community-oriented actor and the ideas that retrospectively legitimated his or her place in a canon of accomplishment. We are discussing, in other words, a fundamental difference between the necessary and the contingent, the product and the process of its production, the abstracted and the embedded. This is not to argue that internalist positions are necessarily etic, externalist emic. Although there is, I am convinced, a somewhat greater tendency for internalist scholarship to reflect an etic point of view, sociologists and social historians often impose their own style of etic analysis as well, focusing, for example, on issues such as "professionalization," or the evolution of institutional forms.
But common sense and the best historical practice tell us that good historians have always sought to employ and integrate both emic and etic perspectives-to see both woods and trees. This means reconstructing the choices, sharing the same assumptions and organizing ideas as past actors even if we see those actors as at some level unknowing integers in a larger calculus. It means using perceptions removed from the historian by time or cultural distance as both substantive element and analytic tool in construing larger structures often opaque to the objects of one's research. Even if a historian pursues etic ends, they must often be attained through emic means, by reconstructing the experience of particular actors in the past. Inaccurate perceptions and incorrect hypotheses are substantive factors, inasmuch as they constitute an aspect of experience, inspire thought, and compel social action.
In the history of science an actor-oriented approach is necessarily intellectual Some critics will contend that such discussion of career patterns and applied science evades the issues of innovation and change that remain the intellectual and emotional center of science and of its history. I would respond that an actororiented, life-course-structured point of view is particularly appropriate to the would-be elucidator of scientific ideas. What can we do, after all, other than reconstruct as best we can the intellectual and institutional options that faced particular individuals or groups of individuals? We cannot with confidence address the ultimate questions of idiosyncrasy and discovery: what used to be called genius is, I feel, too intangible to serve as a promising subject for historical analysis. What the historian must seek to understand is the way in which an Einstein or a Maxwell shared their contemporaries' knowledge and problem agendas; such analysis is less problematic than the more speculative attempt to comprehend the personal equation that allowed them to redefine those options. (And even if one is valiant enough to probe the essence of an individual's creativity, the reconstruction of a protagonist's institutional and intellectual environment remains a necessary precondition.) An actor-oriented approach seeks to appropriate the individual in the service of transcending the individual and thus the idiosyncratic; it seeks to use an individual's experience as a sampling device for gaining an understanding of the structural and normative.3
But perhaps this is belaboring the obvious; to some extent we have become an audience of the converted. It is now fashionable to study subdisciplinary formation, laboratory life, and scientific practice to bring, for example, the implicitly relativistic tools of ethnography to science, even to the once-sacred bastion of knowledge production and elaboration. In general history as well the past quarter century has seen historians move from public policy and elite experience to the behavior and ideas of ordinary men and women-to the microcosm of everyday life and experience. In this sense one can draw a useful parallel between the student of past laboratory practice or a physicist's graduate school training, on the one hand, and, on the other, the social historian of the household or the labor historian seeking to reconstruct the negotiated world of the shop floor.
Yet a kind of dialectic is already manifesting itself. We are already beset by calls for a return to the traditional "big questions" of social change and state policy-even moral judgment-that have so long concerned and motivated historians. Historians of science too must respond to this need to move from the particular to the general, from the individual actor to broader patterns of intellectual and institutional development. The relationship between the particular and general, between meaning and structure, has always been a key to historical understanding; it is a tension that constitutes both a fundamental aspect of reality and an elusive challenge to social science method.
The woods and trees metaphor is particularly apt in this connection. The contemporary ecologist's conception of a particular woods assumes and necessitates an understanding of the trees-their species, their climatic and nutritional needs; woods and trees are in this sense indistinguishable in some sense as interactive system and as a linked research agenda.4 We too must disentangle and specify in our particular sphere the relationships between the actor's perceptions and strivings, his or her institutional climate, the soil that nurtures-or fails to nurtureparticular career and cognitive options. And we must also move this style of analysis into society from the laboratory and library, to evaluate the dissemination and ultimate impact of the products of cognition. We cannot understand the modern world without an understanding of those necessary connections between the individual and his or her discipline, between the discipline and the social sources of its support, between ideas and their real impacts in a real world. It is these interactions at least that originally attracted me to the field and which remain in enticing measure unexplored.
Sometimes one wonders whether the history of science is a coherent discipline or just a collection of scholars aggregated by the accidents of history and the accretion of a common historiography. And in some sense we are indeed a diverse lot, a kind of mosaic, each component tile discrete and isolated. But at the same time we are bound together by certain thematic unities, like any wellcomposed mosaic, and one of those integrating unities is precisely the structured tension between the external and internal. It is not a problem that can be "solved" but a condition of our collective identity. 
